

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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REVIEWED BY

J. M. Razi

SECRET

May 6, 1982

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE

TS AUTH.

RTA 07(3)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

D. CLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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PA OF FOI EXEMPTIONS

362, November 30, Noon

Control: 391

Rec'd: December 2, 1957

10:30 a.m.

MESSAGE CENTER
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DEC 4 AM 8:00

SENT DEPARTMENT 362, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 50, BENGHAZI UNNUMBERED.

On reviewing EMBTELS 338 and 356 it seems advisable to expand slightly on one topic, since we may perhaps be turning corner with Libyans and heading off on better and more realistic course.

During latter days Binhalim government and early days Kubar government Libyans normally discussed size of army from basis of assumption that not less than 10,000 and possibly as many as 20,000 troops would be required. These figures obviously unrealistic, even to many Libyans, and may have been no more than initial bargaining position. In any event, since Embassy has never been in position discuss with Libyans ultimate size which we would deem appropriate and effective, we have consistently refused to be drawn into conjecture concerning size and have confined ourselves to pointing out costs of military establishment, to its essentially non-productive nature, and to such other factors as lack of trained officer material.

However, in recent conversations with Prime Minister and Defense Minister I have found an increased awareness that Libyan army should be held to size appropriate to its still undefined mission. MAAG chief has met similar reactions in conversations with Libyan army commanders. For example, at recent military committee meeting (Libyan, British, US) Libyans tabled a 5-year plan which contemplates by FY 62 one division less one brigade, British-type, approximate strength 5 to 6,000.

In addition, Prime Minister recently agreed with me that any attempts define mission and size of Libyan army in terms of ensuring internal law and order must be predicated upon careful consideration of relationship between Army and paramilitary police forces of Tripolitania and Cyrenacia.

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-2- 362, November 30, Noon, from Tripoli

In terms external security, Prime Minister readily agreed that Libya through treaty with British and acceptance Eisenhower Doctrine has achieved measure security which made unnecessary contemplating Libyan army large enough to "go it alone".

This trend toward realism highly encouraging.

TAPPIN

EAL:HLH/5

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

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